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We propose a new criterion which reflects both the concern for welfare (utility) and the 
concern for rights in the evaluation of economic development paths. The concern for rights is 
captured by a pre-ordering over combinations of thresholds (floors or ceilings on various 
quantitative indicators) that serve as constraints on actions and on levels of state variables. 
These thresholds are interpreted as minimal rights to be guaranteed to all generations. They 
are endogenously chosen within the set of all feasible thresholds, accounting for the “cost in 
terms of welfare”  of achieving these rights. We apply the criterion to several  examples, 
including the standard Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of resource extraction and  capital 
accumulation. We show that if the weight given to rights in the criterion is sufficiently high, 
the optimal solution may be on the threshold possibility frontier. The development path is 
then “driven” by the rights. In particular, if a minimal consumption is considered as a right, 
constant consumption can be optimal even with a positive utility discount rate. The shadow 
prices of thresholds play an important role in the determination of the rate of discount to be 
applied to social investment projects. 
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 1 Introduction
Much of normative economic theory is built on the premises that individuals seek to max-
imize their \utility" or \welfare,"and that social welfare is the sum (or weighted sum) of
individual welfare. Under utilitarianism, or more generally welfarism, it is legitimate to
prescribe policies that lead to increase in the welfare of some individuals at the expense
of the welfare of other individuals, as long as \social welfare" rises. At some extreme, the
life of a person could be sacriced for \the greater good" of the society. In an intergen-
erational context, the welfare of a generation can be sacriced without limit to increase
the intertemporal welfare by raising the welfare of other generations. Many philosophers
have expressed the concern that utilitarianism, or more generally welfarism, does not
take \rights" seriously. They argue that all individuals should be entitled with some ba-
sic rights, such as life, health, and a \decent standard of living." John Rawls [23] pointed
out that \optimal growth" (under some utilitarian objective) may unreasonably require
too much savings from poor generations for the benets of their wealthier descendants.1
More recently, the same rationale has led environmentalists to argue that the present
generations, in their pursuit of wealth and wellbeing, are depriving future generations of
their rights to natural assets.
Sustainable development has been described in the Brundtland report [33] as devel-
opment \that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs." Current patterns of growth, however, induce con-
cerns for sustainability, and in particular with respect to environmental degradations.
Intergenerational equity and environmental concerns are thus cornerstones of sustainabil-
ity. Reecting the concerns for rights, environmental issues are often addressed with
quantitative approaches on physical measures, and thresholds. Along these lines, it is
argued that society should impose constraints, in the form of oors or ceilings, on various
1In a similar vein, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) found it disconcerting that earlier generations should
carry the burdens for the benets of later generations. In his essay, \Idea for a Universal History with
a Cosmopolitan Purpose," Kant put forward the view that nature is concerned with seeing that man
should work his way onwards to make himself worthy of life and well-being. He added: \What remains
disconcerting about all this is rstly, that the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks
only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further stage from which they can raise
still higher the structure intended by nature; and secondly, that only the later generations will in fact
have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a whole series of their forefathers...had worked
without being able to share in the happiness they were preparing." See Reiss [24] (p.44).
2variables. For example, health, education, and biodiversity should not fall below certain
levels, while emissions of pollutants should not exceed a certain level. These environmen-
tal constraints, when they are eective, induce some \costs" in term of welfare growth.
In the climate change debate, a ceiling of green house gases concentration would impose
restriction on the current growth pattern as emissions would have to be curtailed. This is
the cost of providing future generations the right to live in a more or less tolerable climate.
When dening such an environmental constraint, current generations trade o this cost
and the level of the environmental objective they agree to sustain for future generations.
It is well recognized that if oors are too high and ceilings are too low, the set of
possible actions will be empty. Assuming that the set of feasible actions is not empty,
there is still the question of trade-os between oors and ceilings. Martinet [19] described
the trade-os between several sustainability objectives (i.e., quantities that should be sus-
tained), without considering welfare or growth concerns.2 The thresholds are interpreted
as minimal rights to be guaranteed to all generations. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1]
examined the implication of a oor on consumption on the growth path of a society that
optimally chooses its oor.
In this paper, we propose a criterion for ranking social alternatives, based on an
indicator called \Rights and Welfare Indicator" (RWI for short). This indicator combines
a welfare index (based on the conventional utilitarian objective of maximizing the integral
of the discounted stream of utility derived from the consumption of goods and services)
with an index of rights, such as the right to satisfy basic needs or the right to have access
to natural capital and to biodiversity. The index of rights is an aggregate measure of
various thresholds representing \sustainability" in a broad sense. As in Martinet [19],
our index of rights is an index of the threshold levels, not of the extent to which society
exceeds the various thresholds. This index is non-decreasing in each threshold level. It is
likely that increasing any threshold will reduce the welfare index. In this sense, there is
a tension between rights and welfare.
We explore the implications of this approach by the means of examining the RWI.
We illustrate these implications on the path of resource use. We put forward the view
that society does not seek to maximize \welfare" (in a standard sense oered by welfare
2In particular, Martinet does not address the question of how to rank growth paths that satisfy the
optimally selected combination of minimal rights, when several paths are sustainable in his sense.
3economics), but instead makes trade-os between welfare and rights. Maximizing the
value of the Rights and Welfare Indicator (which is not a measure of social welfare) is a
way to represent these trade-os.
Our paper is related to the paper by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1], which proposed
a \Mixed Bentham Rawls Criterion" that seeks a trade o between a utilitarian indicator
and the consumption level of the worse-o generation. If the latter is interpreted as a
minimal consumption right, one may argue that the model of [1] is a special case of our
model, where there are many minimal rights. However, [1] did not refer to the above
interpretation.
Following Martinet [19], we assume that, for each right, it is possible to construct an
indicator function showing at each point of time how a society is faring in terms of meeting
that right. A threshold for an indicator is the numerical level below which the indicator
is not allowed to fall. An indicator is a function of a set of state variables and control
variables. For example, a possible indicator for adult literacy could be the percentage of
adults who can write and read at a certain level of prociency; a possible indicator for
biodiversity could be the number of species not in serious danger of immediate disappear-
ance. Since the maintenance of an indicator above a threshold level typically requires the
use of resources, it is plausible to argue that for any given level of resource endowment,
there is a well-dened \threshold possibility frontier," which is the upper boundary of
a \threshold possibility set." While Martinet focused on the choice of thresholds on the
threshold possibility frontier, we allow for the possibility that a society may choose to be
inside the frontier, because the cost of being on the frontier, measured in terms of forgone
consumption of some goods and services, may outweigh the value of guaranteeing a high
level of the rights represented by the thresholds.
The threshold possibility frontier delimits a set of feasible thresholds within which a
vector of \optimal thresholds" would be chosen. The optimal threshold vector precisely
balances the \costs" of thresholds in terms of welfarist consequences (e.g., lower consump-
tion for some generations), and the \moral worth" of thresholds. While the trade-os are
captured by a scalar measure, the latter should not be interpreted as a measure of \gen-
eralized welfare."
We show that, depending on the preferences and the relative weight accorded to mini-
mal rights, the optimal development path may either be a constrained utilitarian path, or
4switch to a development path fully characterized by the minimal rights guaranteed to all
generations (\right-based sustainable development"). When the minimal rights constraints
are eective, social discount rate is dierent from the classical utilitarian formulation.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The motivation of our approach is
detailed in Section 2. We present therein the tension between rights and welfare, as well
as a brief history of sustainability criteria that puts our criterion in perspective. Section 3
presents the implication of the studied criterion in a nite time framework. The results are
illustrated in a model of exhaustible resource allocation. Section 4 presents the implication
of the studied criterion in an innite time framework. The results are illustrated in the
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of nonrenewable resource depletion and capital accumulation.
Section 5 gathers the implications of our results and our conclusions.
2 Motivation
2.1 Rights versus Welfare
The tension between rights and welfarist considerations has been a subject of debate
among philosophers, thinkers, and economists. The Rawlsian theory of justice places
rights above welfare.3 In fact, Rawls's rst principle of justice is that everyone should
have equal rights:\each person is to have an equal right in the most extensive scheme of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others." His second
principle of justice, the dierence principle, insists that social and economic inequalities
are acceptable only if they are arranged so that they are \both (a) to the greatest expected
benet of the least advantaged and (b) attached to oces and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity."In particular, dierence in income is acceptable
only if it improves the life prospects of the least advantaged. Rawls acknowledges that
economic growth is necessary, because without adequate material resources a society
cannot develop institutions that guarantees equal liberties to all. He points out that
3Rawls's conception of justice has its foundation in the theory of social contract advanced by Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant. The initial position conceived by Rawls is a hypothetical situation in which the
contracting parties are individuals hidden behind the veil of ignorance: none of them knows his place in
society, his natural talents, intelligence, strength, and the like. In other words, the principles of justice
are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.
5the dierence principle must be modied to allow for economic growth, as a unmodied
dierence principle would lead to \no savings at all." The need for adequate savings is a
major concern for Rawls, because, \to establish eective, just institutions within which the
basic liberties can be realized"society must have a sucient material base. Generations
must \carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society."Rawls
sketches a theory of \just saving" to modify the dierence principle.4 Wealth creation is
necessary for the eective defense of rights and liberties.
Another inuential philosopher who stresses the preponderance of rights is Nozick [21].
He emphasized the importance of property rights, from a somewhat dierent perspective.
Nozick's work has inspired alternative articulations of libertarian rights with a game-
theoretic avor.5 In our paper, we abstract from game-theoretic considerations.
Dierent from the right-based approach to development is the welfarist approach. This
latter is based on intertemporal welfare functions (i.e., criteria) describing the intertem-
poral performance of the economy.
2.2 A short history of sustainability criteria
The criterion studied in this paper is formally a generalization of the criterion proposed
by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1], taking into account several rights and sustainability
indicators, as in Martinet [19]. To explain the emergence of such a criterion, and the
way it gathers rights and welfare in a unied framework, we present a short history of
sustainability criteria.
To describe the criteria, we consider a continuous time framework, and assume that
the economy is composed of innitely many generations, to focus on intergenerational
equity. We thus make the simplifying assumption that each generation can be assimilated
to a representative agent, and do not address intragenerational equity. Let x be a vector
of n state variables, and c a vector of m control variables. Denote the instantaneous
utility function by U(x(t);c(t);t). The transition equations are _ xk(t) = gk(x(t);c(t);t),
for k = 1;2;:::;n. Given the values of the state variables, the control variables at time t
must belong to a technologically feasibility set A(x(t);t) which is characterized by a set
4See [16].
5See [12, 30, 11, 10, 13, 14, 22, 32], among others. For an overview, see Suzumura [31]. These papers
acknowledge the fundamental contribution of Sen [25, 26, 27].
6of s inequality constraints:
hj(x(t);c(t);t)  0, j = 1;2;:::;s: (1)
For state and decisions, a continuous path is denoted by x() or c(). Given an initial
state x(0) = x0, a given continuous path of admissible decisions ca() generates a single
continuous path of economic states xa().










a(t);t) dt ; (2)
where  > 0 is the constant discount rate. According to this criterion, an economic path
starting from initial state x0 and generated by the decision path c1() is strictly preferred
to an alternative path starting from the same initial state and generated by decisions
c2() if and only if W DU(x0;c1()) > W DU(x0;c2()). A decrease in the utility level of a
generation (no matter how disadvantaged this generation already is and how large is the
considered sacrice) can be justied by a sucient increase in the utility level of some
other generations. This criterion is strongly inequitable, and has been shown to display
\dictatorship of the present," a term coined by Chichilnisky [6]. For example, in the
case of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model, the optimal consumption path under discounted
utilitarianism decreases toward zero in the long run [7]. Dening a criterion that accounts
for intergenerational equity, and in particular for the long run, has been a challenge of
sustainability economics.







According to this criterion, c1() is strictly preferred to c2() if and only if
inft (U(x1(t);c1(t);t)) > inft (U(x2(t);c2(t);t)). Many economists (e.g., [6]) have pointed
out that the maximin criterion is insensitive to the utilities of generations that are not
the poorest. According to the maximin welfare function (3), an increase in the utility
of any generation that is not the least advantaged does not raise social welfare W Mm.6
6The maximin criterion has been strengthened to eliminate some maximin paths that are Pareto
7Moreover, if it is possible to smooth utility over time, the maximin principle leads to
no growth, no matter how small is the initial maximal sustainable utility. There is no
concern for growth, which may be an issue if capital accumulation is needed to develop
and sustain just institutions.
By applying the idea of the golden rule of economic growth to the sustainability
issue, one can dene a development path that reaches and sustains the highest possible
development level. The resulting criterion is termed Green Golden Rule [3], and considers







It has been qualied as a dictatorship of the future by Chichilnisky [6]. Two development
paths generated by decisions c1() and c2() are compared only with respect to their
limiting behavior.
The welfare function proposed by Chichilnisky [6] is a weighted sum of two terms.
The rst term being the usual discounted stream of utilities. The second term is dened
in a way that its value depends only on the limiting behavior of the utility sequence.7
Formally,
W
CHI(x0;c()) = (1   )
Z 1
0
(t)U(x(t);c(t);t) +  lim
t!1U(x(t);c(t);t) ; (5)
where 0 <  < 1, 0 < (t)  1,
R 1
0 (t) < 1. This criterion is neither a dictatorship of
the present nor a dictatorship of the future. It, however, has some limitations (such as
the non-existence of a solution for some simple problems).
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1] proposed to modify the Chichilnisky criterion replacing
the second term with the minimal level of utility of the trajectory over time. The resulting
social welfare function is denoted by W MBR, where the superscript MBR stands for
\Mixed Bentham-Rawls":
W




 tU (x(t);c(t);t)dt + inf
t (U(x(t);c(t);t)) ; (6)
dominated by other paths that have the same minimum level of utility. See [2, 17].
7The original formulation of the criterion is in discrete time and ranks innite sequences of utility. To
be consistent within the present paper, we give the continuous time equivalent.
8where 0 <  < 1. This social welfare function is a weighted average of the standard
sum of discounted utilities and a Rawlsian part, which places special emphasis on the
utility of the least advantaged generation. The positive weight (1   ) on the discounted
utilitarian part implies non-dictatorship of the future, just as it does for Chichilnisky's
welfare function.8 The positive weight  on the Rawlsian part ensures non-dictatorship
of the present.
All the criteria presented above weigh the welfare of the various generations dierently.
This has strong implications in terms of the discounting. More specically, the discount
rate to be used to evaluate project investment with long run impacts is strongly inuenced
by the criterion chosen.
The mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion is in sharp contrast to the standard utilitarian
tradition (see, e.g., any graduate macro-economic textbook) which would treat a family
line as an innitely-lived individual. Such a textbook position could result in requiring
great sacrices of early generations who are typically poor. In contrast, the MBR criterion
avoids imposing very high rates of savings at the earlier stages of accumulation. As regards
sustainability concerns, the maximization of the MBR criterion determines endogenously
a minimal utility level to be sustained forever. The criterion introduces the idea that all
generations (and in particular future generations) have some \right" to enjoy a minimal
utility, and that their welfare cannot be sacriced too much for other generations (in
particular present generations). This approach is, however, still utilitarian, and focused
on intergenerational equity and the \weight" given to each generation.
In a quite dierent perspective, Martinet [19] examined a criterion dening several
sustainability thresholds. A nite number (I) of sustainability issues are represented by
indicators Ii(x(t);c(t)) and thresholds i. These thresholds are interpreted as minimal
rights to be guaranteed to all generations. There are no intergenerational trade-os.
All generations have the same minimal rights with respect to the sustainability issues
considered. The objective is not to weigh the dierent generations in an intertemporal
welfare function, but to dene minimal rights representing sustainability. The achievable
thresholds are traded o to determine what is guaranteed to all generations, with the
8It also implies that social welfare is increasing in Ut, ensuring that the strong Pareto property is
satised. The utility of the least advantaged is thus not the only thing that matters. One may say that





s.t Ii(x(t);c(t))  i ; i = 1;:::;I ;8t 2 R
+ ;
_ x = g(x(t);c(t)) ;
x(0) = x0 :
Martinet's approach focuses on a set of minimal rights, without considering welfare.
The approach proposed in our paper consists in modifying the criterion (6) by changing
the minimal utility over time by an index of sustainability thresholds as in problem (7).The
levels of the minimal rights are dened endogenously, and come at a \cost" in term of
present-value welfare.
In the following sections, we examine the implications of this criterion in a nite time
framework (Section 3) and in an innite time framework (Section 4).
3 Finite horizon
Consider rst the case of a nite horizon T. The initial stocks xk(0), k = 1;2;:::;n, are
given. The terminal stocks are free, subject to xk(T)  0:
Dene F(x0;1;:::;I) as the set of all the economic paths (x();c()) starting from ini-
tial state x0 and satisfying all the constraints dened by the indicators and the thresholds
at all times, i.e.,
F(x0;1;:::;I) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(x();c())
  
     

xk(0) = xk0 ;xk(T)  0 ;
_ xk = gk(x(t);c(t);t) ; k = 1;:::;n ;8t 2 [0;T]
hj(x(t);c(t);t)  0 ; j = 1;:::;s ;8t 2 [0;T]
Ii(x(t);c(t))  i ; i = 1;:::;I ;8t 2 [0;T]
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(8)
Clearly, given the initial stock x0, the set F(x0;1;:::;I) may be empty if the thresh-
olds i are too high. It is sensible to consider only thresholds that are consistent with the
10economic endowment x0. For this purpose, let us dene the set of feasible thresholds,
M(x0) = f(1;:::;I)j F(x0;1;:::;I) 6= ;g :
Assume that the upper boundary of the set M(x0) can be represented by the equality
(1;:::;I;x0) = 0, and that points below this frontier yield (1;:::;I;x0) > 0, where
 is a dierentiable function.
Assume a constant rate of discount   0. A feasible time path (x(t);c(t)) starting






where U(:;:;:) is the instantaneous utility function.
We suppose that society places values on the minimal rights guaranteed at all
times, i.e., on thresholds i, i = 1;:::;I. This valuation is represented by a function
P(1;:::;I) that is increasing in each argument i.
Our Rights and Welfare Indicator (RWI) is dened by J = P(1;:::;I) + (1  
)W(x();c()), where 0 <  < 1 is the relative weight given to \rights." The parameter
 is taken as given (it can be interpreted as the political weight of the \non-welfarist"
proponents). We propose that society maximizes the Rights and Welfare Indicator J:




 tU (x(t);c(t);t)dt : (9)
To maximize the RWI given the vector of initial stocks x0  (x10;x20;:::;xn0), the
planner chooses the thresholds levels, i.e., the numbers (1;:::;I) 2 M(x0), and the
time path c() to maximize the above objective function, over all feasible paths given by
the set F(x0;1;:::;I) dened by eq. (8).
The objective function highlights the potential tension between rights and welfare.
For example, maximizing welfare would call for present-bias consumption smoothing,
with the utility path tilted toward the present if  is high enough; but such present-
bias consumption smoothing may not be desirable if the emphasis on the right of future
11generations to have a minimal consumption is very strong.9
3.1 The necessary conditions
Since (1;:::;I) are constants to be chosen optimally, the optimization problem (9) is an
optimal control problem with (1;:::;I) treated as control parameters. The necessary
conditions for such problems can be derived from Hestenes' Theorem.10 They are as
follows.
Necessary conditions for optimization of the Rights and Welfare Indicator Let
(t) denote the vector of co-state variables, (t) the vector of multipliers associated with
the technological inequality constraints hj(x(t);c(t);t)  0; j = 1;:::;s; , and !(t) the
vector of multipliers associated with the right-based constraints
Ii(x(t);c(t))   i  0; i = 1;:::;I : (10)
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
H(t;x(t);c(t);(t))  (1   )e
 tU(x(t);c(t);t) + (t)g(x(t);c(t);t) ;
and the Lagrangian is
L(t;x(t);c(t);(t);(t);!(t);) = H + (t)h(x(t);c(t);t) + !(t)[I(x(t);c(t))   ] :
An optimal path must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) The control variables maximize the Hamiltonian subject to the inequality constraints
(1) and (10).
(ii) _ k =  @L=@xk; k = 1;:::;n.
9Note that our framework could be extended to consider non-negotiable basic rights. It could be
done either by assuming that there is a set of (exogenous) numbers (z1;:::;zI) 2 M(x0) such that the
planner's choice of the thresholds (1;:::;I) 2 M(x0) must also satisfy the non-negotiable basic right
constraints i  zi, or by taking into account such strong sustainability constraints in the denition of
the preference function P(1;:::;I), as suggested in [19] (p.190).
10See [18, Theorem 7.11.1] for an exposition of Hestenes' Theorem which deals with optimal control
problems involving control parameters and various constraints.
12(iii) _ xk = @L=@k; k = 1;:::;n.
(iv) The transversality conditions for the optimal choice of the control parameters












= 0 ; (11)
with
  0 , (1;:::;I;x0)  0, and (:) = 0 ;
and the transversality conditions for the optimal choice of the nal stocks are xk(T) 
0, k(T)  0, k(T)xk(T) = 0, for k = 1;:::;n.











3.2 An example: Exhaustible resource exploitation with joint
product technology
Consider an economy with an initial stock of an exhaustible resource S0 > 0. Let r(t)  0
denote the rate of extraction. Then _ S(t) =  r(t). We require that S(T)  0.
The economy uses r(t) as an input to produce two consumption goods, denoted by












(e.g., if it chooses to set c1 = 0, then c2 = r
p
2). Consumption levels c1 and c2 must be
non-negative.




2 = r2 more
11I.e., the value of the total derivative of L (along the optimal path) equals the value of the partial
derivative @L=@t, evaluated at the optimal vectors of controls, states, and multipliers.
12The joint product technology assumed in this example may well reect the choice of output levels
made by a professor for a given input level r. For instance, c1 is the number of research papers per year,
and c2 is the number of graduate students per year, while r is \eort" level. Alternatively, for any given



















2, i = 1;2. Let there be two sustainability indicators, and associated thresholds
I1(c1;c2;S)  c1  1 ;
I2(c1;c2;S)  c2  2 :
For example, if S0 = 20 and T = 10, then one can achieve (by setting c2(t) = 0 for





T = 2 for all t 2 [0;1]. If we set the threshold levels at 1 = 2
p
2 and 2 = 0 (e.g.,
if sustaining the level of indicator I2(c1;c2;S) is not considered to be very important),
then a feasible path exists. But if threshold levels are too high, e.g., 1 = 2
p
2 = 2,




2) is empty. If we set
1 = 2 = 2, then a feasible path exists, by choosing r(t) = 2 for all t 2 [0;10] and setting
c1(t) = 2 = c2(t) for all t 2 [0;10].









2  0. The upper boundary of the set of feasible thresholds M(S0) is represented by
the equation (1;2;S0) = 0, where i  0; i = 1;2.
The RWI to be maximized is













3.2.1 Characterization of the optimal solution
The characterization of the optimal solution allows us to state the following proposition:
14Proposition 1 (Constant consumption in the presence of positive discounting)
If the relative weight of Rights, =(1   ), exceeds a certain critical value, then the social
optimum calls for constant consumption despite positive discounting. This critical value
is an increasing function of the discount rate :
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us derive all the necessary conditions. Write the
(present value) Hamiltonian






and the (present value) Lagrangian















=  (t) + 2(t)r(t) = 0 ; (12)
@L
@c1




  (t)c1(t) + !1(t) = 0 ; (13)
@L
@c2




  (t)c2(t) + !2(t) = 0 ;



















 0;(t)  0 ;
_ (t) =  
@L
@S
= 0 ; implying (t) =  (a constant).
The transversality conditions are














!i(t)dt ; i = 1;2 : (14)
15Using the fact that












for all t 2 [0;T] ;i = 1;2 : (15)

















Using symmetry, c1 = c2 and 1 = 2. Let us show that if =(1   ) is large enough,










We must show that the solution (17) satises all the necessary conditions. Substitute for






















Since a necessary condition is !(t)  0, we must check that (18) is non-negative for
all t 2 [0;T]. Hence  must be chosen such that

2
  (1   )
1
p
  0 :
16Choose  such that this condition holds with equality, i.e., 




















T   (1   e T)


 0 for all   0 and T > 0 ;
















The necessary condition (11) requires that   0. This condition is satised if and
only if










Clearly, in the special case where  = 1, condition (19) is satised. But even if  < 1,
























> 0 for all  > 0 and T > 0. Using L'Hopital's rule, we can show
that
T (1 e T)





is increasing in . Suppose
that for given  , S0 and T, there exists a value of , say  > 0 such that eq. (20) holds
with equality. Then if we increase  beyond the threshold , the constant consumption
path (17) will cease to be an optimal solution. 
3.2.2 Implications for discounting
In this subsection, we discuss the policy implications of maximizing the RWI, by oering
some economic interpretations of the optimality conditions. From equations (12) and
















17On the other hand, if individuals are price-takers in a perfectly competitive capital






= (1(t)   ) ;
where 1(t) is the rate of interest facing the consumers (in terms of the consumption
good c1). It follows that if the planner's allocation is to be achieved by a decentralized




















is the marginal cost of consumption c1 in terms of the resource input.

















i.e., using (21), the rate of interest oered to consumers are
1 = 
while the rate of interest oered to producers is zero. This wedge between producer's
interest rate and consumer's interest rate implies an interest subsidy to consumers, to
counter their natural inclination of tilting consumption toward the present.
As private individuals, consumers tend to discount future consumption too much,
violating the constraint on consumption rights of future generations. An interest subsidy
counters this incentive by encouraging them to save.
184 Innite horizon
Suppose the time horizon is innite and the rate of discount  is a positive constant. Then
the social planner chooses  and c() to maximize the objective function:





That is, the planner maximizes
Z 1
0
fP(1;:::;I) + (1   )U(x;c;t)ge
 tdt : (22)
4.1 Necessary conditions
Let  (t) = et(t), (t) = et(t) and w(t) = et!(t). The current-value Hamiltonian of
this innite horizon problem is
H
c = P(1;:::;I) + (1   )U(x;c;t) +  g(x;c;t) ;
and the current-value Lagrangian is
L
c = H
c + h(x;c;t) + w[I(x;c;t)   ]:
The rst-order conditions of the optimization problem are as follows.
@Lc
@c
= (1   )U
0






c = 0 ;
  0; h(x;c;t)  0; h(x;c;t) = 0 ; (23)
w  0; I(x;c;t)     0; w[I(x;c;t)   ] = 0 ;

















= 0 ; (24)
with   0, (1;:::;I;x0)  0, and (:) = 0.
Finally, the transversality conditions with respect to the stocks are
lim
t!1e
 t (t)  0, and lim
t!1e
 t (t)x(t) = 0.
4.2 An example: The production-consumption economy with a
nonrenewable resource
Consider the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of nonrenewable resource extraction and capital
accumulation [7, 8, 28]. Capital stock is denoted by K(t), resource stock by S(t), resource
extraction by r(t) and consumption by c(t). We assume a Cobb-Douglas production
function, i.e., F(K;r) = Kr. The dynamics of this economy are as follows:
_ K(t) = K(t)
r(t)
   c(t); (25)
_ S(t) =  r(t): (26)
We consider the following sustainability indicators of consumption and resource stock,13
I1(c;r;S;K)  c ;
I2(c;r;S;K)  S ;
13Several authors have used the production-consumption economy to address the climate change issue
(e.g., [9, 29]). The nonrenewable resource is related to fossil energy. Stabilizing green house gas (GHG)
concentrations requires limiting the cumulative emissions over time. The in-ground resource stock is used
as a proxy for non-emitted GHG. A limit on cumulative emissions can be represented by a constraint on
resource extraction: a part of the stock has to be preserved.
20as well as the following rights/sustainability constraints (as in [19, 20]):
c(t)  c ; (27)
S(t)  S : (28)
These constraints state that every generation has the right to a minimal consumption
at level c, and the right to a minimal preserved stock S.
The set of achievable minimal consumption and preserved resource stock (c;S) is
characterized by the following relationship (see [19, 20]):
(c;S;K0;S0)  (1   )
 





0   c  0 : (29)
The upper boundary of this set satises (c;S;K0;S0) = 0. It can be represented
by the following \threshold possibility frontier":
c = (1   )
 






This curve has a negative slope and is concave, for all S < S0:
@c
@S























4.2.1 The RWI criterion for U(c(t);S(t))  U(c(t)) and P(c;S)  cc + SS
Assume that P(c;S)  cc + SS (where c and S are non-negative parameters),
and that instantaneous utility is derived only from consumption, i.e., U(c(t)).





 tU(c(t))dt + [cc + sS] ; (31)
subject to
_ K(t) = K(t)
r(t)
   c(t), K(0) = K0, K(t)  0 ; (32)
21_ S(t) =  r(t), S(0) = S0, lim
t!1S(t)  S ; (33)
c(t)   c  0 ; (34)
S(t)   S  0 ; (35)
and
(c;S;S0;K0)  (1   )
 





0   c  0 :
The objective is then equivalent to maximize the expression
Z 1
0
f(cc + SS) + (1   )U(c(t))ge
 tdt :
The current value Hamiltonian is
H










c + wc(c   c) + wS(S   S) :
The necessary conditions of this problem are
@Lc
@c
= 0 , (1   )U
0
c    K + wc = 0 ; (36)
@Lc
@r
= 0 ,  S =  KF
0
r ; (37)






=    F
0
K ; (38)
_  S =  S  
@Lc
@S


































0 = 0 ; (41)
with   0, (c;S;S0;K0)  0 and (:) = 0, as well as conditions (32), (33), (34),
22(35), and
wc  0; wc(c   c) = 0 ;
wS  0; wS(S   S) = 0 :(I have replaced !S by wS)
Remark 1 (Logarithmic valuation of rights) If we had specied P(c;S) 
c lnc+S lnS, then the terms c and S in the last two equations, (40) and (41) would
have to be replaced by c=c and S=S. All other equations would remain unchanged.
4.2.2 Characterization of the optimal solution
Interestingly, condition (41) implies the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal solution of the RWI maximization must be one of three types:
1. If ?
S = S0 the solution is straightforward as the whole resource stock is preserved,
and there is no consumption. The solution (?
c;?
S) is on the threshold possibility
frontier, and corresponds to the corner solution (?
c;?
S) = (0;S0). Consumption
is positive for some nite time, since the model allows the eating up of the capital
stock.
2. If ?
c > 0, then the solution (?
c;?
S) is on the threshold possibility frontier, and
consumption is constant if ?
S > 0.
3. If ?
c = 0, then the solution (?
c;?
S) may be in the interior of the set of feasible
thresholds.
Proof of part 2 of Proposition 2
If ?
c > 0, then c(t) > 0 for all t, which implies positive production, and thus positive
extraction for all t.14 The resource stock will thus be declining at any time t 2 [0;1),
and the constraint S  ?
S will never be binding. It is as if an amount ?
S is set aside,
and the remaining amount, S0   ?
S > 0 is extracted, with exhaustion occurring only in
the asymptotic sense. The associate shadow value wS is then nil at all times. Assuming
that S > 0, condition (41) can be satised only if  > 0, requiring that (:) = 0, which
14In the DHS model, to have consumption always bounded below by a oor c > 0, the resource input
must be positive for all t 2 [0;1).
23means that the solution (?
c;?
S) is on the threshold possibility frontier. Let us show that
c(t) = ?
c for all t (if ?
S > 0 and ?
c > 0). Suppose that c(t) > ?
c + " over some time
interval, where " is some strictly positive number. Then by re-arranging investment and
consumption, it is feasible to ensure that c(t) > ?
c + 1
n" for some number n > 0 for all
t. But we have shown that the solution (?
c;?
S) is on the threshold possibility frontier.
Given ?
S > 0, the inequality c(t) > ?
c + 1
n" would contradict the result that (?
c;?
S) is
on the threshold possibility frontier. It follows that c(t) = ?
c for all t (if ?
S > 0 and
?
c > 0).15 
Proposition 2 implies that an interior solution of our problem is possible only if there
is no strictly positive consumption guaranteed, i.e., ?
c = 0. A part ?
S < S0 of the
stock may then be preserved. In all other cases, the solution is on the threshold possibility
frontier, and consumption is always constant at the level ?
c, corresponding to the maximin
consumption under the preservation constraint ?
S. We devote the next two subsections
to study, respectively (i) the binding solution and (ii) the conditions under which ?
c = 0.
As we don't know a priori which case corresponds to the optimal solution of our general
problem, we dierentiate the \optimal" candidates of each case by using a symbol dierent
from the optimality mark ? used in the Proposition (respectively,  for the binding solution,
and^for the interior solution).
Remark 2 In the above proof, we showed that if (?
c;?
S) > (0;0) is on the threshold
possibility frontier, then c(t) = ?





c)    K(t) + wc(t) = 0 ;
i.e.,






wc(t) =  K(t)   
15Note that, if S = 0, then  = 0 and therefore the solution can be in the interior of the feasibility
set: it would be if  > 0, i.e., when  > 0 and  2 (0;1), the maximin solution would not be optimal.
24where  is some positive constant. Thus, using condition (38),
























dt    = 0










































These two equations determine (?
c;?








Remark 3 In the case of logarithmic valuation of rights (see Remark 1), it is clear that
the optimal ?
c and ?
S are both strictly positive. Hence only part 2 of Proposition 2 applies
in this case.
4.2.3 The \binding" solution
Assume that S > 0. We can characterize the optimal thresholds (
c;
S) when they are
chosen on the threshold possibility frontier, (c;S;K0;S0) = 0.
In this case, it follows from part 2 of Proposition 2 that the solution corresponds to
the maximin consumption under a resource preservation constraint [4, 19, 20, 28]. The


























25It yields a net present value NPV = 1
U(
c) and the constraints yield a sustainability
value P(
c;






S as a function of 
c when these parameters are on the boundary of the
feasibility set from the expression  = 0. We can dene the function 
S =  S(
c) from
eq. (42).
From the expression of J, and the condition on the optimal choice of the parameters





































Loss in terms of preserved stock
(43)
It is shown in the appendix that this feasible solution may satisfy the optimal con-
ditions of the original optimization problem. We shall discuss in subsection 4.2.5 the
conditions on the preference parameters for this solution to be optimal.
4.2.4 No guaranteed consumption
We now turn to the case 3 of Proposition 2, and consider the \optimal" solution when
^ c = 0. This is the only case that allows the optimal choice (^ c; ^ S) to be not on the
threshold possibility frontier, (c;S;K0;S0) = 0.
The optimal trajectory of this case is described in the appendix. The nature of the
solution depends on the value of the marginal utility of consumption when consumption is
nil (i.e., U0(0)). We distinguish two cases: The nite marginal utility case and the innite
marginal utility case. In the nite marginal utility case, it is shown that consumption is
positive over a nite time interval, after which the economy stays at a stationary state
with no consumption, no capital stock, and the preservation of a resource stock ^ S. In
the innite marginal utility case, the consumption is positive at all times, and a part of
16Providing an explicit expression of the optimal thresholds is possible from this condition given a
specic utility function.
26the stock (S0   ^ S) is depleted asymptotically.
Whatever the case, it is possible to dene some welfare value function V (S0 S;K0),
depending on the preservation constraint threshold S, which satises:






s:t: _ K(t) = K(t)
r(t)
   c(t) ;
_ S(t) =  r(t) ;
K(0) = K0 ;
S(0) = S0   S :
The optimal conservation threshold ^ S must solve
max
S
J(S)  (1   )V (S0   S;K0) + SS : (45)
Assuming that the previous value function can be characterized, the optimal conser-






S(S0   ^ S;K0)
| {z }








which is equivalent to
@
@S




We cannot characterize further the expression of ^ S without knowing the expression
of the value function.17 We can say, however, that there is a unique solution, as the value
17It is usually not possible to have a close-form solution to problem (44). We provide an example of
characterization of this value function in the appendix.
27function is monotonic increasing and concave in the states if utility is strictly increasing
and concave consumption.18
Moreover, corner solution are not excludable. On the one hand, if V 0
S(S0;K0) 

(1 )S, it is optimal to preserve none of the resource stock, i.e., ^ S = 0. This case
corresponds to the unconstrained utilitarian solution. On the other hand, if V 0
S(0;K0) 

(1 )S, it is optimal to preserve all the initial resource stock, i.e., ^ S = S0. This case
corresponds to case 1 in the lemma.
4.2.5 Parameter conditions
We can then ask what the values ;c;S,  are, such that (?
c;?










c = 0. In particular, we can ask if there is a range
of values of  for which an interior solution occurs.
We have some ^ S(;;S) on the one hand, and a 
c(;;c;S) and the associated

S(;;c;S) =  S(
c) on the other hand.
Each candidate provides a RWI as follows:
^ J = (1   )V (S0   ^ S;K0) + S^ S
and
J










We can say that (?
c;?
S) = (0; ^ S) if ^ J > J. It is hard to go further without
the expressions of the various candidates (and the value function). Our results, however,
suggest that there are some parameters value for which the solution is a discounted utility
path with conservation of a part of the resource, and other values for which the solution
is driven by the minimal consumption and resource preservation rights.
Fig. 1 illustrates these two cases. Note that for P(c;S)  cc +SS, the iso-value
RWI curves correspond to planes in the space of welfare index and rights (with relative
slopes depending on (1   ), c, and S).
















Preserved resource stock μS 
Preference plane      
(iso-RWI value) – case 2 
Preference plane      
(iso-RWI value) – case 3 
Figure 1: Trade-os between welfare and rights in the DHS model.
4.2.6 Implications for discounting
Let us oer some economic interpretations of the necessary conditions. In the absence
of minimal-rights constraints, we would have the following familiar eciency conditions.
First, the Hotelling rule states that the resource price rises at an exponential rate equal





dt = F 0
K.
Second, the Keynes-Ramsey rule states that the rate of growth of consumption is equal




c and the dierence
between the interest rate facing consumers, (t), and the utility discount rate . In a
competitive economy without externalities and policy intervention, the consumption rate
of interest (t) is equal to the marginal productivity of capital. The Keynes-Ramsey rule
29reads _ c
c = (F 0












=    (t) ;
and tells us that the consumption increases over time (i.e., the rate of change of marginal
utility is negative and marginal utility decreases) if the consumption discount rate (the
interest rate) is larger than the impatience represented by the utility discount rate. Al-
ternatively, expressing the consumption discount rate as a function of the utility discount
rate, the growth rate and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i.e.,






one gets the usual expression of the discount rate to apply to investment project. It is
equal to the sum of pure preference for the present plus the wealth eect.
When the minimal right constraints are binding, these conditions are modied.
If the resource preservation constraint is binding, the dual variable wS is positive, and






























That is, if some resource stock is to be kept in the ground after a certain time T, when
extraction stops, it must be the case that the resource owners nd that, after time T, the
price at which they can sell the resource as an input, namely F 0
r(r();K()) for  > T,
does not rise fast enough to compensate for the loss of interest income. (Presumably, at
T they can sell the remaining resource stock to the government to keep it in the ground
for ever, at the price F 0
r(r(T);K(T))).
When the guaranteed consumption constraint is not binding, wc = 0 and we get the
usual Keynes-Ramsey rule. When the constraint is binding, the wealth eect is modied.
If the minimal consumption constraint is binding, the dual variable wc is positive, and










 K   wc
d
dt
































    
c(t)
Thus, the implicit interest rate that consumers should use to discount consumption is
c(t) dened by

c(t) =   

 K












On the other hand, let I(t) be the interest rate used to discount the future returns






















This wedge between producer's interest rate and consumer's interest rate implies tax or
subsidy on savings, to ensure minimal consumption rights.
For example, if it is socially optimal to have constant consumption for ever, then the
implicit interest facing private households should be c(t) = , while the interest rate
facing producers is F 0
K (which is greater than  earlier in the program, when the capital
stock is low, and less than  later in the program, when the capital stock is high, along
the constant consumption path of the DHS model).
5 Concluding Remarks
The present paper introduces a criterion that accounts for Rights and Welfare in ranking
social alternatives of development paths. The criterion is a weighted sum of a welfare
index and an index of minimal rights guaranteed to all generations. Such a criterion could
31represent the choice of a democracy where the RWI reects the preference of voters. The
miminal rights are chosen by the voters (who are homogeneous in our model). At the same
time, we assume that when individuals make their own private decisions (e.g., how much
to consume, how much to bequeath to their children) they are not individually guided by
their concern for rights. These latter are implemented by the elected government.
Our examples illustrate the possibility that, at some point, minimal rights are so
important that the path of feasible trajectories is reduced to a single path, and the
willingness to satisfy these minimal rights intertemporally drives the development path
(right-based sustainable development).
We have also shown that the necessary conditions yield implications about discount
rate to be applied on investment projects. In particular, satisfying minimal consumption
may imply some wedge between consumers and producers interest rates, possibly
implemented by tax or subsidy on savings.
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32A Appendix
A.1 Binding case: Optimality of the feasible path
Let us show that the described feasible solution is optimal. Consider a given 
c > 0.
Because 
S =  S(
c); it is not feasible to have a phase [0;T] where c(t) > 
c for all
t 2 [0;T].
In other words, given 
c > 0 and 
S =  S(







_ K = K(t)
r(t)
   c(t), K(0) = K0, K(t)  0
_ S =  r(t), S(0) = S0, lim






By construction, we know this problem has a feasible solution (as described above) where
c(t) = 
c for all t, and the value of this feasible program is 1
U(
c). But does this feasible
solution satisfy the necessary conditions for problem (48)? Let us check (we use the
superscript M to distinguish this problem from problem (31)). The necessary conditions
for problem (48) are derived below.The current value Hamiltonian is
H
















c (c   

c) :
The necessary conditions of this problem are
@LM
@c
= 0 , (1   )U
0







= 0 ,  
M

















=    F
0
K
_  S =  S  
@Lc
@S
, _  S =  S
and also (32), _ S =  r(t), S(0) = S0, limt!1 S(t)   S(
c);c   





c [c   

c] = 0
Setting c(t) = 













c (t) =  
M
K (t)   constant
which is OK as long as  M
K (t) is never smaller than that constant.
A.2 Interior solution: Characterization of the optimal paths
A.2.1 Finite marginal utility case
If the solution is not on the boundary of the feasibility set (:)  0, one has  = 0. In
this case, condition (40) leads to
R 1
0 e t!cdt = c. Since c is positive by assumption, it
follows from the above equality that wc must be positive over some time interval. Some
generation will experience the minimal level of consumption, i.e., ^ c(t) = 0 for some t.
Using a similar argument, we conclude that the constraint S(t)  S must be binding,
i.e. there exists some T such that for all t  T the stock remains at S forever. Combining
these two requirements, this means that there is some time T from which the economy
stops using the resource, producing and consuming. We term this part of the path \phase
2." During phase 1 (positive consumption), the dynamics are driven by exactly the same
conditions as the Dasgupta-Heal solution (discounted utility).
To solve the problem, we proceed backward. We rst characterize phase 2, to obtain
the terminal conditions of phase 1. We then solve the phase 1 problem, treating the time
T as a parameter to optimize.
34Phase 2: Starting from some time T, assume a stationary state at stock S(T) = S
without extraction and consumption.
We have a stationary state with both sustainability constraints binding. The as-
sociated dual variables are positive. The necessary conditions (40) and (41) are not
very helpful: for any T, there are many (non-stationary) paths wc and wS satisfy-
ing these conditions, with no other implications. We deduce from condition (36) that
 k = (1   )U0(0) + wc(T) but we cannot determine wc(T).
Since capital has no use after T, we expect that all the capital stock is gradually eaten
up before T is reached, i.e., limt!T K(t) = 0. After time T, the marginal products F 0
r and
F 0
K are not dened (the marginal products depend on the factor ratio r=K which is not
dened after T). Making use of information before time T, we have the following system
of three dierential equations: the Keynes-Ramsey Rule,
dlnU0(c)
dt

















and the transition equation
_ K = F   c :
Together with the three boundary conditions
Z T
0
r(t)dt = S0   S ;
K(0) = K0 ;
K(T) = 0 ;
we can determine (in principle) the time path of (c;K;r) for given T and S. (NOTE:
we do not impose that c(T) = 0).







Given that c = 0, the Rights and Welfare indicator is
J = (1   )W(T;K0;S0   S) + SS
Maximizing J with respect to S and T determines the optimal length of Phase 1 and
the optimal 








= 0 () (1   )H
c(T) = 0
This condition(and the continuity of H(t)) implies that
lim
t!T
[U(c(t)) +  k(t)[F(t)   c(t)]    S(t)r(t)] = 0




A.2.2 Innite marginal utility case
In the case where U0(0) = 1, the phase 2 described in the previous case would not exist.
In this case there is some S > 0 that is set aside from the beginning. To determine S
we can proceed as follows.
Consider the discounted utility maximization a la Dasgupta and Heal, and the asso-
ciated value function for an initial stock of resource S0   S:







_ K = K(t)
r(t)
   c(t), K(0) = K0, K(t)  0 ;
_ S =  r(t), S(0) = S0, lim
t!1S(t) = S :
This function can in principle be calculated (though not in closed form).19
Value function for a special case of the Dasgupta-Heal model Suppose the social
planner wants to treat all individuals symmetrically and seeks to maximize the life-time




















, K(0) = K0
_ S =  r, S(0) = S0
K  0
S  0
Let V (K;S) be the value function of the social planner's problem. The Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation is, after substitution,













To get an analytical solution, we make the following assumptions on parameter values:
Assumption A1:  = 
Let us conjecture that, for K > 0 and S > 0, the value function takes the form
V (K;S) = AK
1  + BS

19For some special cases of problem (49), it is possible to obtain a closed form solution for the value
function. In this case, using the expression of the value function, it is possible to solve explicitely problem
(45).
37Then we have














The FOCs with respect to c and R are
c















































































For " to be positive, we need A(1   ) > 0. This condition is satised .










Proposition 3 Assume A1. Under the social planner, the optimal extraction rule and












We can now solve for the optimal paths. From






























and equation (56), we can construct a phase diagram in the space (K;S) where K is











(1 )= (this is a locus for _ K = 0) (59)
39For points (K;S) above that curve, we have _ S < 0 and _ K > 0. Below that curve, we
have _ S < 0 and _ K < 0. It follows that the typical optimal trajectory has the shape of
an inverted letter C:Starting with a low stock of K, capital at rst rises, reaches a peak,
then falls.
Given S0, the dynamic equation for K is, from eq (57) and (56),




















_  = (1   )K















This is a rst order linear dierential equation in k of the form _  = M exp( t)   D,
which is easy to solve.












The optimal path under the social planner consists of two phases. In Phase I, capital is
accumulated. In Phase II, both the capital and the resource stocks fall steadily toward
zero. Consumption reaches its peak at the transition point between Phase I and Phase II.
Proposition 5 The value function is




















[1] Alvarez-Cuadrado F. and Long N.V. (2009) A mixed Bentham{Rawls criterion for
intergenerational equity: Theory and implications. Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 58:154-168.
[2] Asheim G.B. and Zuber S. (2011) A complete and Strongly Anonymous Leximin
Relation in Innite Streams. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
[3] Beltratti A., Chichilnisky G. and Heal G. (1995) The Green Golden Rule. Economics
Letters 49(2):175-179.
[4] Cairns R. and Long N.V. (2006) Maximin, a direct approach to sustainability. Envi-
ronmental and Development Economics 11:275-300.
[5] Chakravorty U., Moreaux M. and Tidball M. (2008) Ordering the extraction of pol-
luting nonrenewable resources. American Economic Review 98(3):1128-1144.
[6] Chichilnisky G. (1996) An Axiomatic Approach to Sustainable Development. Social
Choice and Welfare 13:231-257.
[7] Dasgupta P. and Heal G. (1974) The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources.
Review of Economic Studies 41:1-28.
[8] Dasgupta P. and Heal G. (1979) Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. Cam-
bridge University Press.
[9] D'Autume A., Hartwick J. and Schubert K. (2010) The zero discounting and maximin
optimal paths in a simple model of global warming. Mathematical Social Sciences,
59:193{207.
[10] Deb R. (1994) Waiver, Eectivity, and Rights as Game Forms. Economica 61:167-
178.
[11] Gaertner W., Pattanaik P.K. and Suzumura K. (1992) Individual Rights Revisited.
Economica 59:161-177.
[12] G ardenfors P. (1981) Rights, Games and Social Choice. No^ us 15:341-356.
41[13] Hammond P.J. (1995) Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights. In Barnett W.,
Moulin H., Salles M. and Schoeld N. (eds.), Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.55-77.
[14] Hammond P.J. (1996) Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights.
In Arrow K.J., Sen A.K. and Suzumura K. (eds.), Social Choice Re-examined, Vol.2,
London: Macmillan, pp.82-95.
[15] Long N. V. (1979) Two Theorems on Generalized Diminishing Returns and their
Applications to Economic Analysis. Economic Record, 55:58-63.
[16] Long N.V. (2007) Toward a Theory of a Just Savings Principle. In J. Roemer and K.
Suzumura (Eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability, Palgrave, London.
[17] Long N.V. (2011) A Dynamic Game of Environmental Exploitation between Two
Countries with Sequential Maximin Objectives. International Journal of Develop-
ment and Conict 1(3):1-15.
[18] Leonard D. and Long N.V. (1991) Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization
in Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[19] Martinet V. (2011) A Characterization of Sustainability with Indicators. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 61:183-197.
[20] Martinet V. and Doyen L. (2007) Sustainability of an economy with an exhaustible
resource: A viable control approach. Resource and Energy Economics 29:17-39.
[21] Nozick R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
[22] Peleg B. (1998) Eectivity Functions, Game Forms, Games, and Rights. Social Choice
and Welfare 15:67-80.
[23] Rawls J. (1971) A theory of Justice. Oxford, England: Clarendon.
[24] Reiss H. (1970) Kant's Political Writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[25] Sen A.K. (1970a) Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden-Day.
Republished, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979.
42[26] Sen A.K. (1970b) The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 78:152-157.
[27] Sen A.K. (1976) Liberty, Unanimity and Rights. Economica 43:217-241.
[28] Solow R.M. (1974) Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources. Review of
Economic Studies 41:29-45.
[29] Stollery K. (1998) Constant utility paths and irreversible global warming. Canadian
Journal of Economics, 31(3):730{742.
[30] Sugden R. (1985) Liberty, Preference and Choice. Economics and Philosophy 1:213-
229.
[31] Suzumura K. (2005) An interview with Paul Samuelson: welfare economics, \old"
and \new" and social choice theory. Social Choice and Welfare 25(2):327-356.
[32] Suzumura K. and Yoshihara N. (2008) On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights.
Working Paper, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[33] World Commission on Environment and Development { WCED (1987) Our common
Future, Oxford University Press.
43